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Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation: Balancing Interests
Under the Clean Water Act
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1862, Mr. Bamford sued Mr. Turnley for producing "unwhole-
some vapours, smokes, fumes, stinks and stenches."1 Since that time,
our industrial advancement has resulted in widespread manufactur-
ing of products that, like the bricks from Mr. Turnley's kiln, results
in pollution. Mr. Bamford sued under the law of nuisance, which
balanced the private interests of the aggrieved landowner against the
utility of the offending activity. Today, the impact of industrial pol-
lution has become a matter of public nuisance. Realizing the inabil-
ity of nuisance law to cope with this problem, Congress has enacted
pollution control legislation to control the problem at the national
level. However, Congress did not remove the citizen's power to en-
force pollution control.
The subject of this Note is the citizen's right to enforce provisions
of the Clean Water Act' (CWA) by bringing suit against violators
1. Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 67, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. Ch. 1862).
2. Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), Pub. L., No., 82-500, 86 Stat. 816, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). These provisions are the 1972 amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. The "citizen suit" provisions, §§ 505 of the Clean Water
Act, are set out in 33 U.S.C 1365:
§ 1365. Citizen Suits
(a) Authorization; Jurisdiction. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Adminis-
trator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with
the Administrator.
(b) Notice. No action may be commenced -
(1) Under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged viola-
tion (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation
occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
in federal court. In Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation,' the Supreme Court was faced with balancing the "citi-
zen-plaintiff's" interest in enforcing pollution-control laws against
the "industrial-defendant's" interest in adequately defending pollu-
tion enforcement suits and remaining free from frivolous actions.
The issues in this case were the citizen's right to bring suit for dam-
ages created through past violations of the CWA and the require-
ments which the citizen-plaintiff must meet to receive standing. This
Note will discuss these issues by introducing the facts of the
Gwaltney dispute. This Note will examine the pertinent law existing
prior to this dispute by focusing on a three-way split in the federal
appellate courts. Finally, this Note will recount the Court's opinion
and concurrence, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
the positions taken by the majority and concurrence.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Petitioner, Gwaltney, a subsidiary of Smithfield Foods, Inc.,
owned and operated a meat-packing plant near Smithfield, Virginia.
Smithfield Foods purchased Gwaltney from ITT-Gwaltney, Inc., tak-
ing control of the plant on October 27, 1981. The plant was located
on and discharged wastewater into the Pagan River. Five months
after purchasing the plant, Gwaltney installed a new wastewater
treatment system to control a number of pollutants 4 which it dis-
charged under a NPDES permit issued by the Virginia State Water
Control Board.5 The system controlled fecal coliform concentrations
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting
a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a
court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff
has given notice of such action to the Administrator. . . . (g) Citizen. For the
purposes of this section the term "citizen" means a person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected.
3. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
4. The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) was estab-
lished under the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). Under this system, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is empowered to issue permits allowing dis-
charges of manufacturing effluent into surface water. The permits set the conditions con-
trolling the discharge, including "effluent limitations" which establish maximum quanti-
ties or concentrations of certain substances that may be discharged. The permittee is
subject to enforcement action by the EPA or a citizen-plaintiff if the conditions of the
permit are violated.
The pollutants involved were fecal coliform, chlorine (C2), total suspended solids
(TSS), total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), and "oil and grease." The limitation for chlorine
was last violated in October 1982: The limitation for TKN was last violated on May 15,
1984. Chesapeake Bay Foundation Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 791 F.2d 304, 307
(4th Cir. 1986).
5. Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), which allows the implementation of state
NPDES programs, the Commonwealth of Virginia implemented a federally approved
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by injecting chlorine into wastewater. This control strategy resulted
in a violation of fecal coliform limits whenever too much chlorine
was added. These violations were disclosed in "Discharge Monitoring
Reports" (DMRs) which Gwaltney submitted to the Water Control
Board.'
The findings of the District Court indicate that Gwaltney violated
its permit limitations on TKN, chlorine and fecal coliform on many
occasions between October 27, 1981, and August 30, 1984. Due to
installation of new chlorination equipment in March 1982, the last
reported chlorine violation occurred in October 1982, and the last
reported coliform violation occurred in February 1984. Due to an
upgraded wastewater treatment system in October 1983, the last
TKN violation occurred on May 15, 1984.
Due to these violations of Gwaltney's NPDES permit, Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc. (CBF), and Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil (NRDC) filed a citizen suit pursuant to section 1365 of the
CWA.8 CBF and NRDC are non-profit corporations which have the
purpose of protecting natural resources.9 These corporations have
many "members" that reside in Virginia. 10 CBF served a notice of
intent to sue in February 1984, and brought a citizen suit against
Gwaltney in June 1984.11 The complaint stated that Gwaltney "has
violated . . . [and] will continue to violate its NPDES permit." 2
CBF and NRDC was granted a partial summary judgment from
the District Court on grounds that Gwaltney was in violation of the
NPDES permit.' Gwaltney moved to dismiss due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, arguing the CWA did not permit suits for past
violations and that it had ceased to violate its permit before the suit
was filed.' 4 The District Court denied the motion to dismiss and
NPDES program. VA CODE ANN §§ 62.1-44.2 to 44.32 (1950).
6. Permit holders are required to maintain Discharge Monitoring Reports by 33
U.S.C. § 1318(a)(3)(A) and 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1)(4) (1984). DMRs declare the con-
centrations of pollutants present in the plant's effluent stream. Once submitted, these
reports become public information under 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A)(iii).
7. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 379 (citations omitted).
8. Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp.
1542 (E.D. Va. 1985).
9. The defendants will be referred to as "CBF" for the remainder of this Note.
10. CBF has approximately 19,000 members residing in the Chesapeake Bay area
and NRDC has approximately 800 members in Virginia. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 306.
11. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381.
12. Id. at 380.
13. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1544.
14. Id.
Gwaltney appealed. 15 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of Gwaltney's motion, holding that suits were author-
ized for wholly past violations only."6 This holding added to an al-
ready existing split of authority between the appellate courts, which
is discussed in the following section.
Regarding whether Gwaltney's violation was "wholly past" or
"continuing," it is important to keep in mind that once Gwaltney's
wastewater treatment system was balanced, the chlorine violations
ended thirty-two months before suit was filed and fecal coliform vio-
lations ended four months before suit was filed. TKN was treated in
a separate system, which yielded its last violation one month before
suit was filed.
III. PRIOR DECISIONS BACKGROUND: RESOLUTION OF
CONFLICTING CIRCUIT HOLDINGS
In resolving Gwaltney, the Supreme Court was confronted with a
three-way split among the circuits regarding whether plaintiffs could
bring an enforcement action against a polluter's wholly past viola-
tions of the CWA.
A. The Fourth Circuit:
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation
In opposition to Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,",
the Fourth Circuit, in the lower Gwaltney decision, held that suits
were authorized for wholly past violations.' 8 The court advanced
four arguments in favor of allowing citizen suits for wholly past vio-
lations. First, the court found that the present tense construction in
section 1365 did not preclude suits for past violations. It noticed that
a similar construction was used to describe EPA's enforcement pow-
ers under the CWA and that such powers definitely extended to past
violations.' 9 Second, the court determined that although citizen suits
were limited to a supplementary role in enforcement, a bar to sue for
past violations was not one of the limitations. The only limitations
expressly provided by Congress were held to be those of the notice
requirement and the bar to suit where the Administrator had already
taken enforcement action.20
Third, the court distinguished the Hamker case by pointing out
15. Id. at 1550.
16. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 304.
17. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
18. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d 304.
19. Id. at 309.
20. Id. at 310. See supra note 2, for description of these notice and prior enforce-
ment provisions.
[VOL 25: 857, 1988] Gwaltney v. CBF
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
that Diamond Shamrock was sued regarding an oil spill that was a
"one-time occurrence" and did involve an NPDES permit. The court
stated:
Because no permit violation was involved in Hamker, because only a single
long-past and non-recurring discharge (for which not even a good faith alle-
gation of a possible continuing violation could have been made), and be-
cause the Hamkers failed to allege a violation of any effluent standard or
limitation under the Act, it could be argued that Hamker is distinguishable
and ... inapplicable. 21
Fourth, the court discussed Gwaltney's contention that allowing
suits for past violations would flood the federal courts with citizen
suits. The court admitted that there was danger of a proliferation of
section 1365 suits as well as "state damage claims which could be
brought under pendent jurisdiction. '22 However, the court dismissed
this concern by finding that judicial discretion could control the ad-
mission of state claims under pendent jurisdiction.23 The court did
not discuss a method for controlling a proliferation of purely CWA
claims.
B. The Fifth Circuit:
Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock
In Hamker,24 the Fifth Circuit held that a citizen-plaintiff must
allege an ongoing permit violation in order to meet the requirements
of section 1362. The court based its decision on two major grounds.
First, the court believed that the ordinary meaning of the statute's
language required an allegation of ongoing violation, as it was writ-
ten in the present tense.25 Second, the court concluded that the stat-
utory scheme of section 1365 indicated congressional intent that a
citizen could sue only for ongoing violations. This congressional in-
tent was indicated by the placement of primary enforcement respon-
sibility in the EPA Administrator. Additionally, this intent was indi-
cated by the establishment of a notice provision whereby citizen-
plaintiffs were required to serve notice to the EPA and the alleged
violator sixty days prior to filing suit. According to the court, this
notice provision allowed the administrator to take enforcement ac-
tion prior to filing suit or allowed the permit-holder to come into
21. 756 F.2d at 312.
22. Id. at 313.
23. Id.
24. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
25. Id. at 396.
compliance prior to filing suit.28
C. The First Circuit:
Pawtuxet Cove v. Ciba-Geigy
In Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,2" the First
Circuit held that a plaintiff could not maintain suit for a wholly past
violation but that suit might "go forward if the citizen-plaintiff fairly
alleged a continuing likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined,
[would] again proceed to violate the Act." '28 Thus, the court focused
on the probability that a cessation in permit violations would not
necessarily foreclose jurisdiction over a citizen suit. The following
factors were listed as pertinent considerations: 1) the isolated or re-
current nature of the infraction; 2) the degree of scienter on the part
of the defendant; and 3) the sincerity of the defendant's assurances
against future violations. 9
This three-way split between the First, Fourth and Fifth Circuits
presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to establish uni-
form law regarding citizen suits under the CWA.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority Opinion
In resolving the three-way division among the circuit courts, the
Supreme Court held that section 1365 did not permit citizen suits
for wholly past violations.30 This restrictive holding was modified by
the introduction of an allegation-based system of federal court juris-
diction under the CWA: a "good-faith allegation of continuous or
intermittent violation" was held to invoke the subject matter juris-
diction of the federal courts. 1 Additionally, a "sufficient allegation
of fact," not proof, was held to establish standing. 2
1 Maintenance of Suit for Wholly Past Violations
In deciding to disallow suits for wholly past violations and arriving
at its allegation-based jurisdictional theory, the Court explored the
same ground as did the lower courts: the construction of CWA sec-
tion 1365, the legislative history of CWA section 1365, and the po-
tential effects of allowing past suits.
26. Id. at 395. The notice provision is set out in note 2, supra.
27. 807 F.2d 1089 (lst Cir. 1986).
28. Id. at 1094.
29. Id.
30. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382-83.
31. Id. at 385.
32. Id.
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a. Statutory Construction
After examining Congress's wording of section 1365, the Court
determined that the statute was drafted to permit citizen suits for
ongoing violations only.
First, the Court believed, as did the Court of Appeals, that the "to
be in violation" language was ambiguous. However, the Court felt
that the presence of ambiguity did not leave all interpretations
equally acceptable. It found that "to be in violation" was most rea-
sonably construed to impose a "requirement that citizen-plaintiffs al-
lege a state of either continuous or intermittent violation - that is, a
reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in
the future."33
Second, the Court saw the "pervasive use" of present tense in sec-
tion 1365 as indicating that citizen suits were addressed to ongoing
violations. The majority found Congress' definition of "citizen" to be
the most "telling use" of present tense, stating: "This definition
makes plain what the undeviating use of present tense strongly sug-
gests: the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the
present or the future, not in the past."34
CBF argued that Congress' choice of the phrase "to be in viola-
tion" was a careless accident that resulted from a "debatable lapse
of syntactical precision."35 The majority disagreed, finding identical
language in other environmental statutes to authorize purely pro-
spective relief.36 Denoting similar language used in the Solid Waste
Disposal Act and the most recent amendments to the CWA, the
Court stated that Congress knew how to draft liability for past viola-
tions and would have used such language in section 1365 if such
liability was intended.3"
CBF pointed out that the phrase "is in violation" was drafted into
CWA sections 1319(a) and 1319(b), which authorized the Adminis-
trator to issue compliance orders and bring civil compliance suits.38
Since these CWA sections allowed the EPA to bring civil actions for
past violations, CBF contended that the parallel phrase in section
33. Id. at 381.
34. Id. at 382. The definition of "citizen" in section 1365(g) is set out in note 2,
supra.
35. Id. at 381 (citing Brief for Respondents at 8).
36. Id. The Court cited three other environmental statutes: the Clean Air Act, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act.
37. id.
38. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 309.
1365 permitted citizens to bring similar suits.39 Yet, the Court relied
on Tull v. United States" to show that powers to seek injunctive
relief and civil penalties were not intertwined but granted separately
in sections 1319(d) and 1319(b).41 Thus, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed with CBF, pointing out that the phrase "is in violation" ap-
peared only in section 1319(b), which addressed injunctive relief,
whereas section 1319(d), which addressed civil penalties, did not
contain present tense language.
Finally, the majority believed that the combination of injunctive
relief and civil penalties in the same sentence of section 1365(a) gave
citizens the authority to seek civil penalties only in suits for ongoing
violations. The Court stated: "The citizen suit provision suggests a
connection between injunctive relief and civil penalties that is notice-
ably absent from the provision authorizing agency enforcement
. . . . [C]itizens, unlike the Administrator, may seek civil penalties
only in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing
violation." '42
b. Legislative History
After considering the legislative history of section 1365, the Court
stated that the primary purpose of the citizen suit provision was to
afford injunctive relief from ongoing permit violations.43 The justices
denoted legislative history wherein lawmakers frequently referred to
the citizen suit provisions as abatement provisions or injunctive mea-
sures. Further, the majority pointed to Senate and House reports
that linked section 1365 with the citizen suit provisions of the Clean
Air Act, which authorized only injunctive relief.4
Additionally, the Court found that CBF could not support their
contentions by relying on Senator Muskie's statement that "a citizen
has a right under section 505 to bring an action for an appropriate
remedy in the case of any person who is alleged to be, or to have
been, in violation [of the CWAI.""I This reliance was said to be mis-
placed because the Senator's references to "occasional or sporadic"
releases, when construed in context of his full statement,4 could not
39. Id.
40. 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987).
41. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 383.
44. Id. (referring to Water Pollution Control Legislation: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee or Public Works,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1971)).
45. 118 CONG REc. 33700 (1972).
46. Senator Muskie's statement was repotted by the Court as follows:
This 60-day [notice] provision was not intended, however, to cut off the right of
action a citizen may have [with respect] to violations that took place 60 days
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be fairly read to include "wholly past" violations. The Senator's re-
marks were said to emphasize that the intermittent polluter could be
sued in like-fashion to the polluter who violated a permit in a
"steady-stream" fashion.47
c. Effects of Allowing "'Past Suits"
The Court decided against allowing citizen suits for past violations
based on the effects that such suits would have on EPA enforcement
of the CWA. First, the majority stated that allowing suits for past
violations would render as useless the Act's notice provision.48 The
Court believed that notice was required to give the Administrator
time to act and to give the alleged violator time to abate permit vio-
lations, making the suit unnecessary. Under CBF's interpretation,
the notice requirement was said to become merely gratuitous to the
violator.49
Second, the Court highlighted the bar to citizen suits once admin-
istrative action had begun. This bar was said to suggest that citizen
suits were to be supplemental to administrative authority. The Court
believed that allowing suits for past violations would undermine this
supplementary role by removing abstinence from seeking civil penal-
ties as a tool available to the Administrator in negotiating compli-
ance orders. 0 On the above-mentioned grounds, the Court held that
citizens did not have authority under section 1365 to bring compli-
ance suits for past violations.
2. Institution of an Allegation-Based System
As to the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction over citizen
suits for ongoing violations, the majority established an allegation-
based jurisdictional system. This system required that under section
1365, the citizen-plaintiff plead a good faith allegation that the per-
mit-holder was in violation of permit requirements.51 Here, the ma-
earlier but which may not have been continuous. As in the original Senate bill,
a citizen has a right under section 505 to bring an action for an appropriate
[sic] remedy in the case of any person who is alleged to be, or to have been, in
violation, whether the violation be a continuous one, or an occasional or spo-
radic one.
Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 384 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 33700 (1972)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 382. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), supra note 2 (the notice provision).
49. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382-83.
50. Id. at 383.
51. Id. at 385.
jority would consider whether, given the circumstances confronting
the plaintiff regarding proof of an ongoing violation, the plaintiff had
reasonably formed and pleaded a good faith belief that an ongoing
violation existed. The majority's intent to fashion a "lower hurdle"
for the plaintiff to cross was manifest by the rationale given for this
standard: "We agree with the Solicitor General that 'Congress's use
of the phrase "alleged to be in violation" reflects a conscious sensitiv-
ity to the practical difficulties of detecting and proving chronic epi-
sodic violations of environmental standards.' ",52 Thus, the majority
offered the citizen-plaintiff a shorter barrier to hurdle on the race to
trial.
As to standing, the Court's requirement remained liberal. The ma-
jority held that plaintiff's allegations of injury in fact, not proof of
injury, were sufficient to establish standing. "
The Court recognized that this allegation-based standard was per-
missive, but the majority believed that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure would protect defendants by requiring pleadings
to be made in good faith, "well grounded in fact," and formed after
"reasonable inquiry."' 54 By including this "grounded in fact" require-
ment as a modification to a purely allegation-based jurisdictional
scheme, the majority stopped short of erasing a defendant's ability to
challenge jurisdictional facts. As the majority pointed out, a defend-
ant may still attack the factual basis of the plaintiff's allegations, but
the defendant must show that the plaintiff could not have a good
faith belief in the existence of the permit violations which was well
grounded in fact and formed after reasonable inquiry. This theory
seems to allow the plaintiff a greater opportunity to reach trial, as
the defendant would have a more difficult time showing lack of
"good faith belief well grounded in fact" than the absence of a genu-
ine issue of material fact.55
Additionally, the Court stated that defendants could protect them-
selves through motions for summary judgment and motions to dis-
miss for mootness. The Court reminded the defendants that these
allegations could be challenged by a motion for summary judgment
where the defendant could show that the allegations were "sham and
raised no genuine issue of fact. 56 If the defendant failed to make
such a showing, the case would then proceed to the merits, where the
plaintiff would be required to prove its allegations in order to pre-
52. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 18).
53. Id., n.5 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). "Art. III's re-
quirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself
.".Id.
54. Id. at 385.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 386 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973)).
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vail.57 Therefore, the system of allegation-invoked jurisdiction was
not to replace the plaintiffs need to prove the existence of an ongo-
ing violation at trial.
The majority stated that principles of mootness would operate to
protect the defendant where violations had been ceased and the
source of the violations had been remedied. The defendant would be
protected where it could prove that there was "no reasonable expec-
tation that the wrong [would] be repeated." 8 The burden on the
defendant was said to be a "heavy one" that would be met only
where it was "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior
could not reasonably be expected to recur." '59 This heavy burden of
proof would protect the plaintiff against mere "protestations of re-
pentance and reform."60 Therefore, where the defendant could
clearly prove that the conditions leading to violations had been reme-
died, the case would be dismissed for mootness.
Considering the allowances made to each party, the majority's de-
cision counterbalances the plaintiff's easier road to trial by allowing
the defendant to move for dismissal if compliance is obtained during
the litigation process.
B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, con-
curred in part and concurred in the judgment."1 These Justices dis-
agreed with the institution of an allegation-based jurisdictional sys-
tem and argued for the institution of a proof-based system. Under
the following analysis, the concurrence concluded that the citizen-
plaintiff should be made to prove jurisdictional facts if those facts
are challenged. 62
The concurrence believed that a plaintiff's burden in commencing
a suit differed from its burden in maintaining that suit once jurisdic-
tional facts were challenged. Justice Scalia interpreted section
1365(a) to allow a plaintiff only to commence a suit with good-faith
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)) (ci-
tations omitted).
59. Id. (quoting United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968)) (emphasis added by Justice Marshall in Gwaltney opinion).
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 333
(1952)).
61. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring).
For brevity, this concurring opinion will be referred to as the "concurrence."
62. Id. at 387.
allegations. Citing cases involving amount in controversy and diver-
sity of citizenship, he argued that if jurisdictional allegations were
challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff would have to prove them
to maintain suit.63 Thus, the concurrence believed that the allega-
tions regarding subject matter jurisdiction, when challenged, had to
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence in summary proceed-
ings. Once this issue was decided, permit compliance occurring
thereafter would have no effect on jurisdiction. In fact, Justice Scalia
specifically stated that compliance after the date of filing would not
"'oust[]' the court of its jurisdiction." 4 Under this standard, he
would not consider compliance data generated after the filing date to
show a state of compliance in support of a motion to dismiss for
subject matter jurisdiction.
The concurring justices supported their position that the plaintiff
must prove the accuracy of the alleged jurisdictional facts with three
decisions in which the plaintiff attempted to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion through procedural bases. 65 Since these decisions dealt with mo-
tions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under governing procedures,
the jurisdictional and standing questions were fairly straightforward
and easily decided by pre-trial motions. These summary issues did
not resemble the logistically difficult points of proof presented in
Gwaltney; thus these cases offered little support for the proposition
that plaintiff must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evi-
dence in complicated pollution cases.
A fourth decision cited by the concurrence, Land v. Dollar,6" in-
volved an action against members of the United States Maritime
Commission for wrongful detainer of private property. The com-
plaint alleged that Commission members were wrongfully retaining
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Mullen v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)).
65. Thompson v. Gaskill dealt with diversity jurisdiction and held that the "policy
of Judicial Code § 24(1), conferring jurisdiction by diversity of citizenship, calls for strict
construction of the statute." 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942). If a "plaintiff's allegations of
jurisdictional facts are challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff must support them by
competent proof, or the bill must be dismissed." Id.
KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press dealt with amount in controversy and held that "where
the plaintiff's allegations as to the amount in controversy are challenged by the defendant
in an appropriate manner, the plaintiff must support them by competent proof." 299 U.S.
269, 278 (1936).
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. dealt with amount in controversy and
held that a plaintiff in District Court must plead the "facts essential to show jurisdiction
[in this case amount in controversy] and must carry throughout the litigation the burden
of showing that he is properly in court .... If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are
challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by compe-
tent proof . . . ." 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (emphasis added). In McNutt, the sole
jurisdictional question before the court was that of amount in controversy. The court
limited its examples of "essential jurisdictional facts" to amount in controversy and di-
versity of citizenship.
66. 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
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possession of common stock delivered to the Commission as security
for a loan. The respondents, shareholders, argued that the Commis-
sion members were acting beyond the scopes of their duties and
asked that they be restrained from selling the stock and directed to
return it to the respondents. The Commission members moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the suit was barred under
sovereign immunity because it was against the United States. The
Supreme Court stated that the question of jurisdiction was depen-
dent on the decision on the merits, since the suit could advance
against the individual Commission members if they were found to
have acted beyond the scopes of their duties.67 The Court affirmed
the lower court, holding that "the District Court has jurisdiction to
determine its jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision on the
merits." 68s
Thus, Land held that the plaintiff must prove its allegations, but
only at trial. At first glance, this decision seems to go against the
concurrence's proof-based system. However, Land and Gwaltney
may be distinguished. In Land, jurisdiction and merit issues were
identical, because the finding on the merits and the finding regarding
jurisdiction depended on the court's view of the defendants' actions
occurring prior to the time suit was filed. No new evidence could
have been created after the filing date that would have applied to the
decision on the merits but not to the jurisdictional decision. However
in Gwaltney, compliance data generated after the time of filing was
relevant to the decision on the merits and the decision regarding ju-
risdiction, but could not be used to determine jurisdiction. Thus, the
impact of post-filing circumstances made it impossible to base the
jurisdictional finding on the merit finding. 9 Therefore, Land, consid-
ered in its entirety, does not contradict the concurrence's theory
prohibiting a decision regarding subject matter jurisdiction to be
made concurrently with the decision on the merits in cases such as
Gwaltney.
The concurrence's requirement of proof in summary proceedings
would greatly increase the citizen-plaintiff's burden. Procedurally,
since the existence of a continuing violation is predominantly a fac-
tual issue, it could not have been decided without extraneous evi-
67. Id. at 738-39.
68. Id. at 739.
69. One must keep in mind the distinction between the discovery of existing evi-
dence that would affect the jurisdictional decision and the creation of previously non-
existing evidence that would affect the decision on the merits.
dence. With the introduction of extraneous evidence, a motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ripens to resemble a
motion for summary judgment.7 0 The district court may grant sum-
mary judgment only where "everything in the record ...demon-
strates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.17 1 Logically, to
require the plaintiff in such a case to rebut opposing evidence by
proving its jurisdictional allegations by a "preponderance standard"
would require the plaintiff to prove its entire case in the summary
proceedings, a burden more onerous than the usual summary judg-
ment "existence of a genuine issue" standard. 2
Under the concurrence's proof-based system, Justice Scalia stated
that the proper question on remand was whether Gwaltney was in
violation at the time of filing, not whether CBF's allegations were
made in good faith. Since Gwaltney disputed the jurisdictional alle-
gations, the concurrence believed that CBF should have been made
to "prove" those allegations in summary proceedings. Such proof
would have required the citizen-plaintiff to show that the permit
holder was in a "state" of violation at the time the suit was filed.
The concurrence stated that once a defendant violated an effluent
limitation, it would remain in a state of violation "so long as it has
not put in place remedial measures that clearly eliminate the cause
of the violation. 73 If the defendant was in violation at the time of
filing, subsequent events could not oust the court of jurisdiction. In
this case, the concurring Justices stated that the lower court should
determine whether the petitioner had "taken remedial steps that had
clearly achieved the effect of curing all past violations by the time
suit was brought. ' '74
V. DIscussIoN
Under the concurring opinion, to show subject matter jurisdiction
the plaintiff must prove the alleged ongoing violation by a prepon-
derance standard.75 This standard places a more onerous burden on
the plaintiff at the outset of trial than does the majority's standard.
However, this burden, in practice, may be no heavier due to the
broad parameters announced for defining a "state of compliance."
To show an ongoing violation, the concurrence required proof of
70. Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972). For a discussion see
FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 434 (1985).
71. Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 952 (1lth Cir. 1986)(quoting Keiser
v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original)).
72. As will be seen from the following discussion, it does not seem possible that the
concurrence intended the usual summary judgment "existence of genuine issue" standard
to be used with respect to subject matter jurisdiction.
73. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 387.
74. Id. at 388.
75. Id. at 387.
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complete and clear eradication as evidenced by the employment of
"remedial measures that clearly eliminate the cause of the viola-
tion.117 This language gives a trial court sufficient latitude to fashion
for the plaintiff a lighter burden in proving an ongoing violation by
defining a "state of compliance" that would be difficult for the de-
fendant to obtain.
This Note agrees with Justice Scalia's statement: "I cannot claim
that the Court's standard and mine would differ greatly in their
practical application. 77 In fact, the malleability of each theory,
through applying the question of "good faith belief" by the majority
and the definition of "state of compliance" by the concurrence, af-
fords the trial judge significant discretion in determining subject
matter jurisdiction. Only through that judge's exercise of this discre-
tion would one scenario favor one party over the other.
Although we now know that a citizen-plaintiff cannot sue for a
wholly past violation, we are no closer to knowing what actions by
the permit-holder constitute a wholly past violation. Thus, the dust
settles leaving the same problem: It is still unclear what set of cir-
cumstances will allow the citizen-plaintiff to sue under the CWA.
In 1985, two authors expressed the need for resolving the past vio-
lation issue. While discussing the Hamker opinion, they stated that
"the continuing violation argument has now become a standard part
of the defense repertoire, and it will continue to take up the time of
courts and litigants until this conflict in statutory construction is au-
thoritatively resolved."178 As previously discussed, the Supreme Court
has taken a step in resolving the confusion which had split the fed-
eral circuits. The effective length of the Court's stride and the op-
tions to be provided for citizen suits will depend upon the shapes into
which future litigation will mold the following considerations.
A. Defining "Continuing Violation"
First, the court must reach a workable, consistent definition of
"continuing violation." The majority recognizes that the defendant
may be in violation from either "continuous" or "intermittent" re-
leases. The concurrence describes this concept by articulating a
"state" of noncompliance.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 388.
78. Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary As-
sessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833,
860-61 (1985).
The phrase in § 505(a), "to be in violation". . . suggests a state rather
than an act. . . .A good or lucky day is not a state of compliance. Nor is
the dubious state in which a past effluent problem is not recurring at the
moment but the cause of that problem has not been completely and clearly
eradicated. When a company has violated an effluent standard or limitation,
it remains, for purposes of [the Act], "in violation" of that standard or
limitation so long as it has not put in place remedial measures that clearly
eliminate the cause of the violation.7 9
This concept must become sufficiently tangible to provide a consis-
tent measure for all cases but sufficiently pliable to apply to the vari-
ety of technical questions raised by different types of pollution.80
Neither our environment nor our economy can afford a standard that
is applied inconsistently by the federal circuits.
B. Rule 11 Parameters
Second, the courts must set parameters for the application of Rule
11. This procedural rule, applied to this case, states that the plaintiff
must certify that "to the best of the signer's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry if [the allegation of con-
tinuing violation] is well grounded in fact . . .
Applied to the Gwaltney facts, this standard requires the plaintiff
to show: (1) State of violation: Past DMR's must be shown to
demonstrate a history of violation; and, (2) Lack of abatement:
Plaintiff must show a lack of information demonstrating that the
state of violation has been abated.
Generally, the defendant may show the allegation false by demon-
strating that the problem has been clearly abated. As proof, the de-
fendant may offer monitoring data from DMR's not available to the
plaintiff at filing. Obviously, the shorter the pre-filing abatement his-
tory, the stronger must be the defendant's showing that the abate-
ment was complete.
82
79. Gwaltney, 198 S. Ct. at 387.
80. The concurrence's definition may not be complete, as it does not encompass the
permittee who has a long history of perfect performance with one recent, minor violation.
Under such a circumstance, it is unclear how the "upset provisions" will apply in court.
These provisions allow permittees to contest liability for exceeding a discharge limit by
arguing that the incident was exceptional, unintentional and composed only temporary
non-compliance. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n) (1987).
In SPIRGNJ, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the district court held that the upset pro-
visions did not apply, since Congress did not intend for "courts to examine the factual
circumstances underlying each of a series of exceedences over an extended period of
time. Therefore, the 'upset' regulations are irrelevant to this case, which involves more
than one hundred and fifty exceedences over five years." 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1431
(D.C.N.J. 1985). This holding gives little guidance for cases where the defendant has a
much better record.
For a case discussing continuous violation under the Clean Air Act, see United States
v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Md. 1987).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
82. Litigation is centering on violation in fact of the discharge permit terms.
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Given the highly technical nature of pollution monitoring, future
decisions may define "reasonable inquiry" and "well grounded in
fact" largely on a case-by-case basis. However, citizen suits are
brought as part of a regulatory scheme. This scheme would lose
much of its efficiency if the citizen-plaintiff could not determine its
investigatory responsibilities and the regulated community could not
ascertain consistent enforcement policies and its own monitoring re-
quirements under the NPDES. Such circumstances would deter citi-
zens from pursuing permit violations. Additionally, permit holders
may well be encouraged to meet only minimum requirements be-
cause they could not justify sizeable capital expenditures to meet in-
consistently defined obligations. Thus, parameters must be placed on
the application of Rule 11 to provide consistently imposed obliga-
tions on both parties.8 3
Further, the plaintiff must not be allowed to abuse this allegation-
based theory by using other than the most currently available DMRs
or by feigning ignorance when it knows that the defendant has
abated discharge. The federal courts should inhibit abuse of good-
faith allegations by heavily sanctioning plaintiffs that bring ground-
less suits. Likewise, the defendant must not be allowed to raise
empty proclamations of repentance where violations have not been
truly abated.
In Mumford Cove Association, Inc. v. Town of Groton, the town was not excused for
violations of its permit because pollution might have been due to factors other than the
permitted sewage discharge. Additionally, the town was not excused from violation be-
cause it had made every reasonable effort to comply. 640 F. Supp. 392 (D. Conn. 1986).
In Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., the court held that enforcement of permit
violations was based on strict liability and a good faith but improper recording of dis-
charges allowed under permits would not act as a good defense. In addition, summary
judgment against the defendant was found appropriate as a matter of law,. since viola-
tions were listed in DMRs and the defendant offered no evidence to contradict the list-
ings. 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1128, 1130-31 (D. Md. 1985).
However, in Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enterprises, Inc., the court held that DMRs
filed by the defendant did not constitute conclusive proof that the permit was violated
where "defendant has offered a multitude of justifications for the alleged violations,
along with convincing arguments why many of the alleged violations should not actually
constitute violations (e.g., typographical mistakes in the DMRs)." 618 F. Supp. 532, 536
(W.D.N.Y. 1984).
83. Pertinent questions include: 1) Whether DMRs carry equal weight when used
by defendant to show lack of violation as when used by plaintiff to show violation; 2)
Whether the plaintiff meets its burden of reasonable inquiry by suing on the basis of past
DMRs or must collect its own "up to date" monitoring data to meet the reasonable
inquiry requirement; and 3) If the plaintiff must collect its own data, whether the collec-
tion and analysis methods were reasonable.
C. Standing Requirements
Third, the courts must set standing requirements which can be
consistently applied. To meet standing requirements, the plaintiff
must show "injury in fact." Plaintiffs in CWA cases may show
standing more easily than those alleging a general constitutional in-
jury; because Congress has created a "zone" of standing through the
wording of the statute, the CWA-plaintiff need meet only the re-
quirements of Article 111,84 whereas, the plaintiff who sues under a
general constitutional theory must overcome the courts' use of stand-
ing as a tool for judicial self-restraint as well as the requirements of
Article 111.85
As noted above, the Court cited United States v. SCRAP" when
discussing the defendant's right to show a sham pleading. In
SCRAP, the Court created a liberal rule for showing injury in fact.
Professor Davis writes: "Probably the SCRAP case represents an all-
time high in Supreme Court liberality on the subject of standing. ' 8
7
The Court even quoted an earlier treatise by Professor Davis, which
stated that "[tihe basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is
that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a ques-
tion of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle
supplies the motivation."88
Citizen suits are intended to supplement a regulatory system. If
the liberal SCRAP standard is to be applied to standing issues, it
must be applied consistently to give both parties notice of their obli-
gations under the system. A standard of this liberality may prove
difficult to consistently apply, because allowing arguments of greatly
attenuated injury throws open the doors for inventive and circuitous
claims. Additionally, since we are coming out of the "capture"
84. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74 (3d ed.
1986) (citing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22
(1976) quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
In Association of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, the Court gave a two-level
test for showing standing pursuant to a statute. The plaintiff is required to show eco-
nomic or other injury in fact and that the injured interest falls within protection of the
statute. 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court held that plaintiffs did not make sufficient allega-
tions to show standing but recognized "[a]esthetic and environmental well-being" as pro-
tected interests. 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
In Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., the court held that allegations of injury to
aesthetic or recreational interests were sufficient to establish standing, where the Sierra
Club alleged that these interests of its members would be harmed by continued pollution
of a river. 617 F.Supp. 1120, 1129 (D. Md. 1985).
85. J. NOWAK, supra note 84, at 74 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
86. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
87. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE 1970's § 22.02-2 489 (1976).
88. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689.
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phase,8 9 where regulatory agencies were unduly sympathetic to regu-
lated industries, such easily met requirements may no longer be nec-
essary to correct an unfair balance.
D. Mootness and Considerations of Pollutant Monitoring
Technology
Fourth, the mootness doctrine must be tailored to meet the highly
technical showings required in environmental suits. The doctrine of
mootness may be applied by the defendant, prior to final judgment,
to show that the state of violation has been abated and that the case
should be dismissed. The Court states that the defendant must
demonstrate that it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." 90 Given the nu-
merous scientific assumptions which are made during the develop-
ment of monitoring equipment and the possibility of error entailed in
the use of monitoring equipment, proof of mootness may center on
highly technical considerations.
Here, the courts should be concerned with the rapidly advancing
sensitivity and precision of monitoring instrumentation. There is po-
tential for technology battles with one side claiming that its data is
more precise than that of the opposing party. The defendant may be
in danger of being shown to be in violation where the monitoring
technology it employs meets the requirements under NPDES but
falls short of more powerful plaintiff technology. As such arguments
become more focused on technical matters, the ranges of uncertainty
become greater. Thus, a broad standard of mootness may be difficult
to create and apply to these environmental questions. 91
89. For additional discussion of the "capture theory" see Boyer & Meidinger,
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under
Federal Environmental Laws 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833 (1985); Huntington, The Maras-
mus of the LC.C.: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE
L.J. 467 (1952).
90. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386 (quoting United States v. Phosphate Export Assn.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
91. One apt question is whether the technology employed by the defendants in
meeting DMR requirements is sufficient to show a lack of violation in court.
Given that jurisdiction will now be based on good-faith allegations and standing will be
liberally applied in favor of the plaintiff, permit-holders are well advised to keep a prov-
ably spotless record by using state of the art abatement and monitoring technology to
keep all effluent streams free from violative releases. The greatest problem will be decid-
ing what is "provably spotless."
E. Problems Confronting Future Litigation
In applying section 1365, courts must consider its impact on the
number of citizen suits which may be brought, the impact of citizen
suits upon the EPA's and citizens' roles in enforcing the CWA, and
the impact of citizen suits upon the notice provisions of section 1365.
First, future litigation must address the ease with which citizen-
plaintiffs can bring a case to trial, as such will impact the number of
suits brought. The direction resulting from this impact is not clear.
The Hamker court believed that disallowing past violations would
reduce the number of citizen suits by removing one ground on which
they could be brought. The Gwaltney district court thought that dis-
allowing past violations would increase the number of suits. This in-
crease would come from the citizen's need to compel compliance by
defendants with little incentive to abate until suit was filed. The
Gwaltney appellate court thought that allowing past violations would
not flood the federal courts. That court did not discuss how purely
CWA claims would be controlled, but did assert that the judge could
use his or her discretion to control state claims brought under pen-
dent jurisdiction.
There should be concern over use of citizen suits as a vehicle to
bring pendent claims before the federal court. Since the federal
court may choose to decide pendent claims despite dismissal of the
federal question92 and permit violation cases would not be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction until the merits were tried, these suits could
be an attractive vehicle for getting the state claims to judgment in
federal court. Under the lighter, allegation-based requirements for
meeting subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs may be tempted to
bring marginal section 1365 suits in order to append state claims.
The federal judges must weigh this factor strongly when deciding to
allow pendent claims.
Second, future litigation must address the impact of citizen suits
upon the roles of the EPA and citizen in enforcing the CWA. The
Supreme Court sought to keep the citizen's role "interstitial" rather
than "potentially intrusive. '9 3 By keeping the citizen's role supple-
mentary to the EPA's, the Court sought to give the agency more
authority to reach settlements with permit-holders. The EPA's abil-
ity to offer abstinence from suit for civil penalties may prove to be
an important tool in inducing permit-holders to undertake expensive
remedial actions.
Third, future litigation must address the impact of citizen suits
upon the notice provision of section 1365. By holding that citizen
suits may be brought only for ongoing violations, the Court gives
92. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 402-05 (1970).
93. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
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purpose to the notice provisions of section 1365. The notice provision
now serves both the citizen-plaintiff and the permittee. The potential
plaintiff may use the provision to compel compliance without actu-
ally filing suit. The permittee may use the notice provision to diffuse
incorrect allegations of non-compliance or abate violations before the
potential plaintiff could gain standing under the CWA. This poten-
tial for "notice trials" is open to abuse for both sides. Thus, use of
notice provisions should be closely scrutinized by the EPA and
courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Gwaltney has given the lower circuits a general direction in which
to travel in deciding whether a citizen-plaintiff has the right to sue
for NPDES permit violations.94 Beyond that, however, the decision
leaves many questions to be answered. The ruling that jurisdiction is
based on good-faith allegation, standing is to be liberally construed
in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant has a heavy burden in
94. On April 13, 1988, Gwaltney was remanded from the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals to the district court for determination of whether "'citizen-plaintiffs' had proved
an ongoing violation within the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision. 844 F.2d 170
(4th Cir. 1988). The appellate court upheld the district court's earlier finding that CBF's
allegations of ongoing violations were made in good faith. Thus, the subject matter juris-
dictional finding of the district court has again been approved. In remanding, the appel-
late court required proceedings to determine whether, on the merits, "plaintiffs proved at
trial an ongoing violation." Id. at 171.
The appellate court stated that citizen-plaintiffs may prove an ongoing violation at
trial "(1) by proving violations that continue on or after the date the complaint is filed,
or (2) by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing
likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations. Id. at 171-72. The appel-
late court stated,
The Supreme Court Justices who concurred in parts of the majority opinion
and the judgment suggest that because the majority views subject matter juris-
diction to be met by good-faith allegations, the majority implies that a "plain-
tiff can never be called on to prove that jurisdictional allegation." We think
that the majority does expressly require that a citizen-plaintiff prove the exis-
tence of an ongoing violation (continuous or intermittent) in order to prevail.
The majority and the Justices concurring separately differ as to when this proof
would be required, with the concurrence requiring proof of an ongoing violation
as a threshold jurisdictional matter.
Id. at 171, n.1 (citations omitted).
On July 18, 1988, the district court held that Gwaltney's violations were ongoing at
the time CBF filed suit. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 688 F. Supp.
1078, 1080 (E.D. VA. 1988). The court noted: "If the evidence at trial showed a contin-
uing likelihood of recurrence in violations, jurisdiction was proper regardless of the sub-
sequent failure of the hazards to materialize." Id. at 1079. Thus, despite nonrecurrence
of violative discharges after May, 1984, the court found those violations to be ongoing
because there existed a reasonable likelihood of recurrence at the time suit was filed.
proving mootness may be necessary to get all but a few cases to
court, but will inevitably allow many borderline cases to proceed. In
future litigation, the courts must strive to provide a workable defini-
tion of "continuing violation," set parameters for the application of
Rule 11, set standing requirements that may be consistently applied,
and tailor the mootness doctrine to meet the highly technical show-
ings required in environmental suits. Additionally, the courts must
consider the potential effects of their decisions, such as flooding the
courts with citizen suits, confusing citizen and EPA enforcement of
the CWA, and keeping the notice provision of section 1365 intact.
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